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Intragroup Subgroup Attitude Clustering, External Intervention, and Intergroup
Interaction Patterns: Toward a Dynamical Model of Protracted Intergroup Conflict
Abstract
Scholars and practitioners working with protracted conflicts in polarized communities have long
recognized the complex dynamics between intragroup disputes and intergroup relations in these settings.
In fact, the multitude of factors interacting within and between groups in these conflicts, and their
tendency to change over time, largely contributes to their intractable natures. Unfortunately, the ability of
scholars to conduct research on such dynamic phenomena has been largely constrained by the atomistic,
linear approach of traditional research models and methods. However, recent advances in dynamical
systems theory have provided a new set of tools for developing computer simulations that allow us to
model the dynamic patterns emerging from complex interactions of multiple variables over time. This
paper presents one such model: a dynamical model of protracted intergroup conflict. Using data collected
from Israeli and Palestinian communities during the current Intifada, we modeled the dynamic relations
between conflict escalation and international intervention on intragroup subgroup attitude clustering and
patterns of intergroup interactions. Next steps and refinements for the model are discussed.
Keywords
Keywords: computer simulations, dynamical systems theory, intergroup relations, Intifada, intragroup
disputes, Israeli and Palestinian communities, protracted intergroup conflict
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INTRAGROUP SUBGROUP ATTITUDE CLUSTERING, EXTERNAL
INTERVENTION, AND INTERGROUP INTERACTION PATTERNS:
TOW ARD A DYNAMICAL MODEL OF PROTRACTED INTERGROUP
CONFLICT

Peter T. Coleman, Adam Schneider, Douglass S. Adams, Catherine James
Everett,Timothy A. Gameros, Lee R. Hammons, Cecil C. Orji, Ralph M. Waugh,
and Richard F Wicker III

Abstract

Scholars and practitioners working with protracted confUcts in polarized
communities have long recognized the complex dynamics between intragroup
disputes and intergroup relations in these settings. In fact, the multitude of/actors
interacting within and between groups in these conflicts, and their tendency to
change over time, largely contributes to their intractable natures. Unfortunately,
the ability of scholars to conduct research on such dynamic phenomena has been
largely constrained by the atomistic, linear approach of traditional research models
and methods. However, recent advances in dynamical systems theory have provided
a new set of tools for developing computer simulations that allow us to model the
dynamic patterns emerging from complex interactions of multiple variables over
time. This paper presents one such model: a dynamical model of protracted
intergroup conflict. Using data collected from Israeli and Palestinian communities
during the current Intifada, we modeled the dynamic relations between conflict
escalation and international intervention on intragroup subgroup attitude clustering
and patterns of intergroup interactions. Next steps and refinements for the model
are discussed.
Protracted ethnic conflicts have proliferated on the globe since the end of
the Cold War (Lederach 1997), particularly throughout Southeast Asia and on the
African continent, which together account for approximately 80% of the world's
ongoing interethnic disputes (International Peace Research Institute 2003). Despite
all that we have learned over the past 70 years of research on social conflict, the
seemingly intractable nature of enduring ethnic conflicts remains a mystery. While
important work has been done in identifying many of the conditions and processes
associated with protracted social conflicts (see Fisher 1991; Gurr 2000; Coleman
2003; beyondintractability.org for extensive summaries), their high degree of
complexity, equifinality, and mercurial natures have stymied most traditional, linear
approaches to modeling these phenomena.
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This article applies the concepts and methods of dynamical systems toward
the development of a model of protracted intergroup conflict. At a general level, we
are interested in exploring and modeling the impact of protracted intergroup conflict
on patterns of behavior within and between groups in conflict. However, the number
of variables involved in such conflicts is innumerable and impossible to model in
finite detail. Accordingly, our model development process began by exploring the
relationship of three interrelated dynamics that have been previously identified in
the literature as central to the sustained nature of protracted intergroup conflicts:
subgroup attitude clustering within groups ( see Kelman 1999; Starr 1999), external
intervention, and behavioral interaction patterns between groups (see Pruitt & Kim
2004). Subgroup attitude clustering within groups (intragroup) is the distribution of
persons comprising a group along a continuum of subgroups, each characterized
uniquely by the attitudes shared by subgroup members. The term external
intervention pertains to actions taken by parties not affiliated with either conflicting
group yet having an impact on the behavior of the groups. Finally, behavioral
interaction patterns between groups (intergroup) are the general quality of actions
taken by each group's "official" representation in response to internal and external
forces.
Dynamical Systems Theory

Systems' thinking is rooted in the Aristotelian view that the whole is greater
than the sum of its parts (Kozlowski & Klein 1998), and emerged somewhat
independently in the sciences of biology, Gestalt psychology, ecology, and quantum
physics during the 1920s (von Bertalanffy 1968; Capra 1996). In essence, it
contends that in order to understand a given phenomenon, we must see it as
composed of a set of interrelated underlying elements, nested within a context of
other interrelated elements. This view represented a radical paradigmatic shift in the
worldview of many scientists from the atomistic-mechanistic view of the world
championed by Descartes and Newton, toward a more holistic-organismic point-ofview (Jones & Hughes 2003).
Systems approaches to conceptualizing conflict processes have been
gaining increasing attention for conflicts at the individual level (Pruitt & Olczak
1995), in schools (Louis & Miles 1990; Raider 1995; Bodine & Crawford 1998), in
other organizations (Ury, Brett, & Goldberg 1988; Costantino & Merchant 1996),
and in or between nations (Rouhana & Kelman 1994; Pruitt & Olczak 1995;
Lederach 1997; Diamond & McDonald 1996). However, most systemic conflict
models apply only a few of the more basic concepts or principles from the original
formulation of systems theory to an enhanced understanding of conflict.
Advances in dynamical systems theory (DST: see Vallacher & Nowak
1994; Nowak & Vallacher 1998; Vallacher, Read, & Nowak 2002) over the last
decade have developed a sophisticated set of principles and methods for conducting
research on dynamic social phenomena. DST presents dynamism as a necessarily
inherent characteristic of intra- and interpersonal and group experience, and argues,
in studying human behavior, that it is essential to employ models that accommodate
this feature. DST suggests that numerous factors (i.e., elements), both internal (e.g.,
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 12, Number I
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goals, impulses) and external (e.g., outgroup interactions) to a system, act and
interact to influence an individual's or group's thoughts, feelings, and actions (i.e.,
the system) such that they are constantly subject to change. DST diverges from
traditional linear views of causation in two ways: 1) a change in the magnitude of
one element (i.e., the cause) does not necessarily result in a proportional change in
the magnitude of another element (i.e., the effect), and 2) relations among elements
of a system are not necessarily additive [elements are interactive and, therefore,
relations among variables depend on the values of other variables and cannot be
analyzed separately]. Thus, research on nonlinear dynamical systems is best serv.ed
by examining how a given system establishes patterns over time, rather than
examining a particular endpoint in the system [particularly since many systems
never reach a stable endpoint, but instead display sustained patterns of changes (i.e.,
attractors)]. Although empirical methods can be used to identify the central
parameters of dynamical models, computer simulations are the most common tool
employed by researchers of this perspective. The primary task of research from a
DST approach is to describe the connections among a system's elements and the
changes in the system's behavior that these connections promote (Vallacher, Read,
& Nowak, 2002).
Protracted intergroup conflicts are complex, dynamic phenomena which
tend to be highly destructive and traumatic (Coleman 2003). Their persistence can
be the result of a wide variety of different causes and processes, from personality
differences of the individual parties involved to geopolitical power dynamics. Often,
however, it is the complex interaction of multiple factors across different levels of
the conflict over long periods of time that brings them to an extreme state of
hopelessness and intransigence. Thus, the conceptual models and research tools we
employ to study them must accommodate their inherent dynamical complexity.
At the heart of the complexity of many intergroup conflict systems are
dynamic patterns of attitudes and behaviors that are in flux within, between, and
beyond the groups. Scholars have suggested that the intractability of many
protracted international conflicts can be traced to the "two-level" dilemma faced by
the leaders involved (Starr 1999; Putnam 1999). This is the problem of managing a
difficult domestic political landscape while simultaneously responding to an
international crisis. For example, Rushdie (2002) has suggested that the current
tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir can be traced partly to the
domestic difficulties the ruling parties of both countries are facing at home. In these
times, international conflict escalation can serve to distract and unify a nation
struggling within its own borders, thereby allowing the leadership to stay in power.
The importance of such intragroup dynamics is often minimized within the context
of intensely hostile intergroup exchanges. Thus, this model seeks to describe the
central connections between intragroup attitude clustering and intergroup
interactions as they pertain to protracted intergroup conflict.
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Intragroup Subgroup Attitude Clustering, External Intervention, and
Intergroup Conflict Behavioral Patterning
During the progression of protracted conflicts, individuals inhabiting the
system develop significant identifications with and commitments to the individuals
and groups that they perceive to be allied with them in the conflict (McCauley
2001 ). Conversely in these situations, disputants organize against and expend
considerable energy in opposition to the "other." New ingroups and outgroups form,
with membership delineated along the authentic but arbitrary categories relevant to
the conflict, such as nationality, ethnicity, gender, race, and religion (Kelman 1999).
In addition to these intergroup divisions, different subgroups often form within
groups, as seen with the current divisions between the Pakistani government and the
various extremist factions in Pakistan and Kashmir. Again, such subgroupings arc
often delineated along dimensions relevant to the conflict, such as differences in
preferences regarding the strategies and tactics used to engage in the conflict ( e.g.,
hawks, extremists, neutrals, and doves). Deep intragroup divisions and investments
in these subgroup identities can become a substantial factor in determining the
nature of the interaction patterns in intergroup conflicts (Starr 1999; Hicks 1999;
Kelman 1999; 2001; in press; Toscano 1998).
However, intragroup subgroupings are not static, but often shift in terms of
their relative percentages in response to, among other things, the actions and
reactions of both groups in conflict as well as those of the external community.
These shifts within groups can directly affect the level of support for and capacity to
engage in destructive or constructive interactions with the outgroup in the conflict.
In fact these relations are bi-directional: the nature of the subgroupings (attitudes,
relative size, flexibility of opinion, etc.) can impact the quality of behavioral
interactions between groups (for instance, more or less conciliatory), and
differences in intergroup behavioral interactions can affect the relative
configurations of subgroups (percentage of hawks, doves, etc.). In addition,
attempts to intervene from outside the community (by the international community,
members of a Diaspora, NGOs, etc.), further affect these patterns. These dynamics,
although critical to our sense of ongoing conflicts, are not well understood nor
adequately described by current research in this area. Thus, the main objective of
this study is to model the dynamic interplay between shifts in intragroup subgroup
clustering and intergroup behaviors under conditions of ongoing conflict and
external intervention.
Model Parameters
This paper introduces a model of protracted intergroup conflict that
accounts for various interactions between conflicting groups engaged in a protracted
conflict and among competing subgroups within each group. The model's
parameters are illustrated in figure I and outlined in Figure I.
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Figure 1: Summary of interactions included in the model

Intragroup subgroup attitude clustering
Our model examines changes over time to the population density of each
subgroup by taking into account the affect the modeled interactions have on the
attitudes that define the subgroups. We determined the set of subgroups used in the
model by analyzing opinion survey data collected from 2002 to 2003 in the Middle
East during the Intifada. The survey was commissioned by Search for Common
Ground (SFCG), the world's largest non-governmental conflict-resolution
organization. The Jerusalem Media and Communications Center (JMCC), a
Palestinian polling organization, carried out the poll of 599 Palestinians through
face-to-face interviews from November 17-21, 2002. The B.L. and Lucille Cohen
Institute for Public Opinion Research of Tel Aviv University, an Israeli polling
organization, carried out the poll of 508 Israeli Jews by telephone interviews from
November 24-26, 2002. The margin of error in the Palestinian survey is ±4% and in
the
Israeli
survey
±4.5%.
The
full
report
is
available
at
http://www.sfcg.org/Documents/Dec2002PollReport-English.pdf
Our
model
considers seven subgroups identifiable from the survey data within each of the
competing groups. Although it would be possible to define some of the subgroups
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Group2

based on actual factions within the Israeli-Palestinian context, a more universal
model is achievable if the subgroups are more idealized. As such, essential
intragroup behavior within a conflict system falls into three major opinion
categories: Hostile, Moderate, and Peaceful behavior. These categories were further
divided into seven subgroups as follows: Hostile (Hostile Activists and Hawks),
Moderate (Hawk Supporters, Neutrals, and Dove Supporters), and Peaceful (Doves
and Peace Activists). Gray boxes in figure 1 depict the categories; gray circles
depict the subgroups.
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Israeli

Palestinian
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Population
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engagement
Initial

Max

Hostile activist

0

0.01

0.01

-10

5

0.6

1.0

Hawk

1

0.17

0.16

-7

3

0.4

0.6

Hawk supporter

2

0.22

0.31

-4

1

0.2

0 .6

Neutral

3

0.36

0.15

0

3

0.0

0.2

Dove supporter

4

0.15

0.26

1

1

0.2

0 .6

Dove

5

0.08

0.10

5

3

0.4

0.6

Peace activist

6

0.01

0.01

3

5

0.6

1.0

Table 1: Model variables (population distributions and attitude strength are initial
values)
The subgroups occupy a continuum of attitudes, with Hostile Activists and
Peace Activists providing the end points, and Neutrals the relative mid-point for the
seven subgroups (see Table 1). Research on attitude change has demonstrated that
subgroup members typically move dramatically from one opinion category to
another rather than merely incrementally altering their point of view (Latane &
Nowak 1994; Nowak & Vallacher 2001). Hostile Activists and Peace Activists are
more committed to taking action in support of their respective ideologies than are
other subgroup members. For example, in the Israeli-Palestinian system, the Hostile
Activist subgroups would be populated by Palestinian suicide bombers on one side
and by militant Israeli settlement group members on the other, while a Peace
Activist subgroup might include Israelis or Palestinians who actively foment
desertion by military forces within their respective groups (though not necessarily
within the opposing group). Hawks and Doves refer to individuals actively involved
in supporting their respective group's objectives or in preventing the other group's
achievement of its objectives. Hawks advocate more coercive methods to achieve
their objectives while Doves of both groups advocate peaceful, cooperative methods
and would tend to be more open to compromise.
Hawk and Dove Supporters also support the general objectives of their
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 12, Number 1
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hawkish or dovish subgroup neighbors, but do so more passively. Members
affiliated with these population subgroups are interested in seeing the goals of their
respective groups achieved, but are less likely to actively pursue these goals, instead
providing a range of direct and indirect support for their causes. Finally, members
of the Neutral subgroups evidence a high-level of ambivalence with regard to the
conflict, and are not interested in supporting the objectives of either hawks or doves,
and more especially, their methods for achieving those objectives. Rather, Neutral
subgroup members display behaviors that tend toward avoidance. Strong activities
would be required to increase their interest level in any particular objective.
Figure 2: Identity transitions allowed by the model

Figure 2 illustrates the identity transitions permitted by the model, whereby
members from a subgroup can alter their ideology and switch to another subgroup.
The subgroups range from Hostile Activist (0) to Peace Activist (6).
Subgroup Response Preferences
This parameter is a quantitative measure of the response advocated, or
preferred, by the members of each subgroup. These values range from negative
(hostile) numbers to positive (peaceful) numbers. Our model treats this
parameter as constant across all iterations, since each subgroup is defined
uniquely by its preferred response. Although the number of members belonging
to a particular subgroup (i.e., population distribution) may change over time, the
attitude of each subgroup remains constant as defined.
Our model incorporates a negativity-bias into our scale of response
preferences (from -10 for hostile activists to +5 for peace activists), with respect to
previous findings that hostile actions have more impact on relationships than
conciliatory gestures (see Gottman, Swanson, & Swanson 2002). For example,
Hostile Activists tend to exhibit the highest degree of negative actions and reactions
(i.e., a '-10' hostile response) to an action from the opposite group. The next
subgroup, Hawks, tend to respond at a level (-7) that may reflect their preference for
aggressive retaliatory, but not necessarily violent, responses. The Hawk Supporters'
Response Preference is yet lower (-4); this may signify their relatively strong, but
more muted, Response Preferences for aggressive action.
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Another subgroup is comprised of Neutrals who, as a subgroup, have a high
level of ambivalence regarding their Preferred Response, regardless of the actions of
the other Community. In contrast, the Doves have a relative strong tendency (+5) to
act and react with conciliatory, peace-seeking actions in an attempt to contain
violent escalatory spirals and resolve the conflict. The Dove Supporters' Response
Preferences tend to be strongly dampened (+1) relative to that of the Doves. This
Response Preference may reflect subgroup safety concerns and anxieties about
protracted conflict and hostile actions from the other group. The final peace-related
subgroup, Peace Activists, tend to exert extremist "peace-seeking" actions and
reactions that are perceived by the other subgroups as being disturbing,
inappropriate responses; indeed, some of these actions may include coercive
behaviors by this subgroup within the group itself. This subgroup is less likely to
respond as positively (+3) as a result of the extremity of the actions that are
experienced as largely unacceptable to the other subgroups, even other peacerelated subgroups.
Attitude Strength
This paper defines attitude strength as a measure of the intractability of
subgroup members regarding their prescribed Response Preference (e.g., the
strength of a Dove's belief in promoting peace and non-violence and unwillingness
to advocate another approach). Attitude Strength is important in this study because
it is necessary for determining intra-group patterns of behavior change (i.e., the
propensity with which members of a particular subgroup may react to their security
environment by aligning themselves to the Response Preference of another
subgroup). We define attitude strength to be between 1 and 5 with 5 representing
the highest degree of intractability. Evidence shows that members of extremist
groups usually are the least likely to alter their response preference (Latane &
Nowak 1997), which led us to assign the strongest attitude strength of 5 to hostile
activists and peace activists alike. We assigned an attitude strength of 3 to Hawks
and Doves and 1 to Hawk Supporters and Dove Supporters. An attitude strength of
3 was assigned to the Neutral population in both groups due to the high degree of
ambivalence and intransigence typical of this subgroup.
Degree of Engagement
This variable measures the extent to which a particular subgroup advocates,
in an observable manner, its preferred response. Namely, some subgroups
demonstrate a greater willingness than others to remain actively engaged in
promoting their ideologies. This fact is particularly important when a society's
consensus response is determined, because subgroups with high degrees of
engagement will play a larger role than other subgroups in determining their
society's official position. Because no empirical measure of this variable was found,
we were forced to determine our model settings based on observable trends and
comparative estimations. Namely, each subgroup was assigned a number based on
its estimated fractional degree of engagement on a 1.0 scale. Activists were assigned
the greatest initial degree of engagement (0.6), with Hawks and Doves being lower
(0.4), and Supporters being lower still (0.2). Neutrals, by definition, have a low
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degree of engagement (0.0).
The model allowed for variations in degree of engagement. Per our model,
the population densities of non-like-minded categories (Hostile, Moderate, or
Peaceful) within the same society affected a category's degree of engagement (i.e.,
increased recruitment into one category will compel increased engagement by
another category; see Figure l ). We label this phenomenon Intra-societal
Competition. However, constraints were placed on the maximum degree of
engagement allowed for each subgroup. Increasing degrees of engagement within a
subgroup can lead to. behavioral changes among its members, suggesting eventual
migration from that subgroup to another; thus the need for constraints to allow that
migration to occur. These constraints were estimated and included the following
values: Activists were allowed to reach full engagement (1.0), Hawks, Doves, and
Supporters were limited to 0.6, and Neutrals were permitted to approach 0.2.
International Intervention
In addition to the definitions of attitude strength and response preference,
we elected to include a modeling component to represent intervention during a
conflict by external actors. Examples of interventions include sanctions, promises of
support or aid, peace envoys, and United Nations Security Council resolutions. Such
international involvement has been highly visible in most modern conflicts. The
interventions were modeled to occur in response to sufficiently hostile acts by either
side. The threshold for this intervention was examined parametrically to determine
if overall behavior would be affected by varying international interventions.
Additionally, random occurrences of intervention were included to represent the onagain/off-again nature of international interest.
The relative weights for all of the international interventions were modeled
as a bounded yet random variable, ranging from a low positive influence to a slight
negative influence. These limits were based on literature and observations, which
suggest that international pressures on groups in conflict are usually of little impact
in reducing continued conflict, and may actually do harm in some instances. Marcus
Cox expressed this perspective at the 3rd International Security Forum (1998):
"The powers at the disposal of the international community are far less
substantial than is often assumed. The political dynamic is far too fluid and
complex to be controlled by external actors. Ethnic elites respond to
international actions, manipulating institutions for their own benefit, and
diluting or nullifying international policy goals. Attempts to control the
political process at a micro-level produce artificial and transient results."
In a historical analysis, McIntosh (1994) noted that, while international sanctions
were effective against Rhodesia in 1966 and Haiti in 1993, in the 1990s, similar
pressures were ineffective against Iraq and Libya, and the effects of sanctions
against the former Yugoslavia were inconclusive but hardly overwhelming. The
group observed that the effectiveness of international intervention in the PalestinianIsraeli conflict has been limited, accordingly constraining the statistical influence of
external actions in the research model.
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The ratio of positive influences to negative influences has been weighted at
3 to 1. This estimate was derived from analysis of international interventions over
one year of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Center for Cooperative Research
documented major events in the conflict for the months of March 2002 to
September 2002. During that 7-month period, there were approximately 17
interventions in which the international community directly acted towards or with
either or both groups in an attempt to deescalate the conflict. Examples include
French intercession in a building siege, UN resolutions demanding action, Iraqi
pledges to impose oil embargoes and US negotiation sessions. Of those 17
interventions, 9 resulted in positive effects for one side or another, while 3 created a
negative group response, thus resulting in the 3 to 1 weighted ratio listed above.
The same source documented acts of aggression as committed by each
group during the same 9-month period. The source suggested that Israelis
committed 5 5 such acts, while the Palestinians committed 19. The ratio of
international interventions (12) to average acts of aggression (37) was roughly 30%.
This ratio was used to model frequency of international intervention.
Methodology
The methodology used in this study was designed to show: ( l) variations in
responses between two populations after an initial violent attack, (2) the fluctuations
in population subgroup clustering as a result of these responses, and (3) variations in
intercommunal responses and subgroup clustering in reaction to external
intervention. Intragroup movements among subgroups were also permitted based
upon the levels of ingroup, outgroup, and external actor responses, and according to
a set of rules that allowed for flexible movement (see Figure 2). The programming
language used for this model was C ++. Two representative populations were
chosen to portray two hostile communities (see Table 1). Research into this area
produced a poll taken of Israeli and Palestinian attitudes toward inter- and
intragroup actions. The populations have been sorted into seven characteristic
population subgroups with an overall percentage of population assigned based upon
polling data. Each of the population subgroups have then been assigned a response
preference and attitude strength.
Inter and intra-group activities
The model calculates updated parameters one Group at a time, alternating
between the two Groups. For example, the consensus response for Israel was
calculated first based on the polling data. Then, the Palestinian reaction (i.e.,
determination of its new variable states) was calculated taking the Israeli posture
into account. Because stabilization of the model parameters was not achieved, we
ran the model for a predetermined number of iterations: 100, 1000, etc. For each
iteration, the following data were recorded for each Group: consensus response,
subgroup population densities, degrees of engagement, and international
intervention.
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Figure 3: Conensus responses and international interventions through 100
iterations.
Results
Figures 3 and 4 display the results of running the simulation through 100
iterations.
Behavioral Interaction Patterns
Figure 3 displays the behavioral interaction patterns of the two groups, with
both groups demonstrating a tit-for-tat response to the hostile or peaceful gestures
made by the opposing Society. Israeli data is labeled g0, Palestinian data is labeled
gl, and external interventions are labeled ext, short for external. The model
evidenced this pattern of oscillation, even after 1000 iterations. This cyclical pattern
is likely due to the presence of positive and negative feedback loops inherent in the
model.
External Intervention
The responses of groups to each external intervention, which were positively
correlated with the positive or negative impact of the intervention, were short-lived;
dissipating after an additional iteration or two. This lends support to the claim of
relative ineffectiveness of external interventions with regards to long-term effects
on the stabilization or positive or negative impact on two groups in conflict. In
addition, the presence of external interventions had no direct effect on subgroup
clustering.
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Figure 4: Israeli population distributions through I 00 iterations
Subgroup Attitude Clustering
Figure 4 displays the subgroup cluster transitions for the seven Israeli
subgroups (both societies behaved similarly) with the y-axis expressing the
percentage of the population within the various subgroups. The chart shows a rapid
decrease in the proportion of all subgroups except Hawks and Doves. This result
indicates a tendency in the model to favor population shifts toward the extreme
ends, although again the population vacillates between pro-hawk majorities and prodove majorities. Limitations placed on the maximum population allowed in the
Activist categories (both hostile and peaceful) prevented the buildup from occurring
in those subgroups. In fact, the Activists always reach their maximum whether it is
allowed to be 1% or, say, 50%. The oscillatory behavior of the Hawk and Dove
populations is directly linked-to the tit-for-tat consensus response seen in Figure 3.

Discussion and Conclusion
The current model and the findings from this study are preliminary. The
model was able to accurately depict ingroup polarization regarding conflict-relevant
attitudes, and displayed a tit-for-tat interaction pattern, which is common in settings
of prolonged conflict (Pruitt & Kim 2004). The relative ineffectiveness of the
external interventions in our study is supported by qualitative data on actual events
(McIntosh, 1994). And although the model has begun to depict the dynamic
interplay of three critical patterns of variables (intragroup clustering, external
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intervention, and intergroup interaction), it has yet to be developed to the degree
that it can be validated by time-series data from actual events. For example, an
examination of time series data on the Middle East conflict taken from the same
source as our initial population estimates shows a fairly stable population
distribution across all seven subgroups over four measures taken at six-month
intervals from November, 2002 to December 2003. In contrast, our model predicted
an extreme polarization of the population which vacillated from pro-hawk majority
to pro-dove majority. Future revisions to the model will address this discrepancy
between the model and actual events.
Future Directions for Research
This study sought to capture some of the essential features of intra- and
inter-group dynamical behavior by focusing on the shifting of intragroup affiliations
using a limited set of input parameters. The study used a simple action/reaction
model that attempts to capture a time-series evolution of behavior based on simple
rules that govern the response of each of the subgroups within a population. Thus,
the model offers a tool for research on intra/intergroup dynamics in conflict that can
allow us to begin to investigate the effects of key parameters on the overall patterns
observed in such systems. The methodological framework itself suggests several
directions that might be fruitful in pursuing additional research.
To begin, the model uses a population partitioned into specific proportions
of subgroups that share the same basic attitude. It may be useful to apply the model
to a range of groups with different proportions of subgroups to examine the
differences in the behavior. That is, a future study could apply a model to groups
where hawkish attitudes form a greater proportion of the group, or where pacifist
feelings are more predominant, or where the group consists of a more undecided or
even neutral proportion of individuals. It might be suspected that different initial
proportions might lead to different patterns of behavior and perhaps even different
outcomes over the long term. It would also be revealing to subdivide groups into
even finer gradations of attitude and to specify rules for the relationships among
these groups more explicitly.
It may also be useful for the model to account more completely for
additional effects that the conflict would have on each population. The rules of this
model already assume that the conflict exerts certain forces on each individual that
cause shifts in attitudes. However, it could be important to make these forces more
explicit in the calculations and to include such effects as death, disease,
environmental impacts, and economic pressures, for example. These effects might
change the dynamical behavior of the model and reveal new features of that
behavior that cannot currently be extracted from the simple sets of general
assumptions that the model currently employs.
In addition, the most remarkable feature of the findings is that the aggregate
behavior of the subgroups becomes increasingly more extreme in the subgroups'
affiliation behavior. One important question might be: how is this kind of response
moderated or even reversed? What factors could be included in the model that
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would cause individuals within each subgroup to become more moderate in their
affiliations? Specifically, how does the group' s dynamical behavior change when
the groups do not act consistently? How does the dynamical behavior change when
groups act unilaterally without regard to the aggregate response of the group or in a
manner uncorrelated to the actions of the opposing group? What happens when the
level of external involvement changes? Does the international environment
stabilize or moderate the interaction of the groups of the shifting of the subgroup
affiliations? How does the prevailing environment affect the response of each
subgroup? These and other questions remain open for exploration.
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